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Abstract
Cybersecurity of discrete event systems (DES) has been gaining more and more attention recently, due to its high relevance to
the so-called 4th industrial revolution that heavily relies on data communication among networked systems. One key challenge
is how to ensure system resilience to sensor and/or actuator attacks, which may tamper data integrity and service availability.
In this paper we focus on some key decidability issues related to smart sensor attacks. We first present a sufficient and necessary
condition that ensures the existence of a smart sensor attack, which reveals a novel demand-supply relationship between an
attacker and a controlled plant, represented as a set of risky pairs. Each risky pair consists of a damage string desired by the
attacker and an observable sequence feasible in the supervisor such that the latter induces a sequence of control patterns, which
allows the damage string to happen. It turns out that each risky pair can induce a smart weak sensor attack. Next, we show
that, when the plant, supervisor and damage language are regular, it is computationally feasible to remove all such risky pairs
from the plant behaviour, via a genuine encoding scheme, upon which we are able to establish our key result that the existence
of a nonblocking supervisor resilient to smart sensor attacks is decidable. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first result
of its kind in the DES literature on cyber attacks. The proposed decision process renders a specific synthesis procedure that
guarantees to compute a resilient supervisor whenever it exists, which so far has not been achieved in the literature.
Key words: discrete-event systems, smart sensor attacks, decidability of existence of resilient supervisory control
1 Introduction
Cyber-attack resilience refers to properties of service
availability and data integrity. With the continuous ad-
vancement of information and communications technol-
ogy (ICT), in particular, the recent 5G-based IoT tech-
nologies, we are enjoying unprecedented connectivity
around the world. Nevertheless, the threat of cyber at-
tacks that may potentially cause significant damage to
human lives and properties has more frequently become
the center of attention, and has been attracting lots of re-
search from different communities. Basically, an attacker
aims to inflict damage on a target system by disrupting
its control loop. This could be achieved either by inter-
cepting and changing the controllers input signals (in
terms of sensor attacks), or by intercepting and chang-
ing the controllers output signals (in terms of actuator
attacks), or by completely blocking the data transmis-
sion between the controller and the plant (in terms of
denial-of-service attacks). An attack can be either brute-
force, e.g., via hardware destruction or signal jamming,
or covert (or stealthy), i.e., to inflict damage without
being detected by relevant monitoring mechanisms.
A good survey of cyber attacks and cyber defence
with a systems-and-control perspective can be found in
[1]. Typically, linear systems are considered in existing
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works that rely on system identification and control tech-
niques. Within the DES community, most works rely on
the control system setup introduced in the Ramadge-
Wonham supervisory control paradigm [23], where the
plant generates observable outputs, received by the su-
pervisor via an observation channel, and each control
command specified as a set of allowed (or disallowed)
events is generated by the supervisor and fed to the plant
via a command channel. The plant nondeterministically
picks one event from a received control command and
execute it. The event execution process is assumed to
be asynchronous, i.e., up to one event execution at each
time instant, and instantaneous. Unlike attacks in time-
driven systems described in [1], attacks under consid-
eration in a DES aim to change the order of events in
specific system runs. There are two different streams of
research on cyber attacks and resilient control. The first
stream refers to a set of black-box methods that treat at-
tacks as undesirable (either intentional or unintentional)
uncontrollable and mostly unobservable disturbances to
a given closed-loop system. Existing works include, e.g.,
a game theoretical approach [29], fault-tolerance based
approaches such as [5] and [19] on sensor attacks, [2]
on actuator attacks, and [3] [6] [4] on sensor+actuator
attacks, and transducer-based modelling and synthesis
approaches such as [7] [8]. In the black-box methods,
system vulnerability is typically modelled by concepts
similar to diagnosability described in, e.g., [34], and sys-
tem resilience bears similarity to fault tolerant control
described in, e.g., [28] [32], that concerns whether there
is a supervisor that can perform satisfactorily under the
worst case attack scenarios. The second stream refers to
a set of white-box methods, aiming to develop a spe-
cific “smart” attack model that ensures certain intuitive
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properties such as covertness and guaranteed (strong or
weak) damage infliction. Existing works include, e.g., [9]
[10] [11] [13] [12] [20] on smart sensor attacks, [14] [18]
and [17] on smart actuator attacks, and [16] [21] and [15]
on smart sensor+actuator attacks. With such smart at-
tack models, existing research works address the impact
of a specific attack on the closed-loop behaviour, the vul-
nerability of a system to such an attack, and finally the
resilience of a supervisor to a concerned attack.
After examining those existing works on smart cy-
ber attacks, it is clear that most works focus on how to
derive a proper smart attack model. Various synthesis
algorithms have been proposed under relevant assump-
tions. Nevertheless, the existence of a supervisor that
is resilient to smart cyber attacks is still open for re-
search. There are a few heuristic synthesis approaches
proposed in the literature, e.g., [10] proposes one algo-
rithm against smart sensor attacks, [16] proposes one
algorithm that generates a resilient supervisor whose
state set is bounded by a known value, and [18] presents
an algorithm to synthesize a supervisor, which is con-
trol equivalent to an original supervisor and resilient to
smart actuator attacks. But none of those existing algo-
rithms can guarantee to find one resilient supervisor, if
it exists. That is, when those algorithms terminate and
return an empty solution, it does not necessarily mean
that there is no solution.
Before any attempt of overcoming a complexity chal-
lenge in order to derive a resilient solution, it is critical
to answer a computability question first, that is, how to
decide whether a solution exists. To address this impor-
tant decidability issue, in this paper we focus only on
sensor attacks, but hoping that our derived result may
shed light on research of other types of attacks. We fol-
low a sensor attack model proposed in [10], which asso-
ciates each observed sequence from the plant G with an
altered observable sequence that becomes the input of a
given supervisor. We assume that the attacker knows the
models of the plant and supervisor, but not necessarily
their states, and is able to intercept all observable out-
puts of the plant, but may only be able to attack some
observable events. After slightly improving the concept
of attackability originally introduced in [10] and the cor-
responding definition of smart sensor attacks, our first
contribution is to identify conditions that may ensure
the existence of a smart sensor attack. It turns out that
the existence of a smart weak sensor attack, which is not
necessarily regular (i.e., representable by a finite-state
automaton), is solely determined by the existence of at
least one risky pair that consists of a damage string de-
sired by the attacker and an observable sequence feasi-
ble in the supervisor such that the latter induces a se-
quence of control patterns, which allows the concerned
damage string to happen. Because any strong sensor at-
tack is also a weak attack, the existence of such a risky
pair becomes the sufficient and necessary condition for
the existence of a smart sensor attack. In [9] and its jour-
nal version [10], by imposing language normality to the
closed-loop behaviour, , it is shown that the supremal
smart sensor attack language can be synthesis, when-
ever it exists, upon which a specific smart sensor attack
model can be derived. In [11] and its journal version
[12], the language normality is dropped, and it is shown
that a smart sensor attack model (not necessarily supre-
mal) can be synthesized via a special insertion-deletion
attack structure, whenever it exists. However, none of
these works reveals the aforementioned demand-supply
relationship reflected in risky pairs that captures the
nature of sensor attacks. Due to this insightful concept
of risky pairs, our second contribution is to show that
the existence of a nonblocking controllable and observ-
able supervisor that is resilient to smart sensor attacks
is decidable. To this end, we develop a genuine encoding
mechanism that reveals all possible sequences of control
patterns required by a regular sensor attack and all se-
quences of control patterns feasible in the plant, allowing
us to remove the set of all risky pairs from the plant be-
haviour. After that, we introduce a language-based con-
cept of nonblocking resilient supervisor candidate and its
automaton-counterpart control feasible sub-automaton
that does not contain any risky pair, upon which we
are able to decide the existence of a resilient supervisor.
As our third contribution, the proposed decision process
renders a concrete synthesis procedure that guarantees
to compute a nonblocking supervisor resilient to smart
sensor attacks, whenever it exists.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2 we review the basic concepts and operations of
discrete event systems introduced in [26], followed by a
specific smart sensor attack model, where the concept of
attackability is introduced. Then we present a sufficient
and necessary condition to ensure a smart sensor attack
in Section 3, where the key concept of risky pairs is intro-
duced. After that, we present a sufficient and necessary
condition for the existence of a nonblocking supervisor
that is resilient to smart sensor attacks in Section 4, and
show that this sufficient and necessary condition is ver-
ifiable in Section 5, which finally establishes the decid-
ability result for the existence of a resilient supervisor.
Conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
2 A smart sensor attack model
In this section we first recall basic concepts used in the
Ramadge-Wonham supervisory control paradigm [23].
Then we recall a smart sensor attack model introduced
in [10]. Most notations in this paper follow [26].
2.1 Preliminaries on supervisory control
Given a finite alphabet Σ, let Σ∗ be the free monoid
over Σ with the empty string  being the unit element
and the string concatenation being the monoid binary
operation. We use Σ+ to denote non-empty strings in
Σ∗, i.e., Σ+ = Σ∗ − {}. Given two strings s, t ∈ Σ∗, we
say s is a prefix substring of t, written as s ≤ t, if there
exists u ∈ Σ∗ such that su = t, where su denotes the
concatenation of s and u. For any string s′ ∈ Σ∗ with
s′ ≤ s, we use s/s′ to denote the post substring u ∈ Σ∗
such that s = s′u. We use |s| to denote the length of
s, and by convention, || = 0. Any subset L ⊆ Σ∗ is
called a language. The prefix closure of L is defined as
L = {s ∈ Σ∗|(∃t ∈ L) s ≤ t} ⊆ Σ∗. For each string
s ∈ L, letEnL(s) := {σ ∈ Σ|sσ ∈ L} be the set of events
that can extend s in L. Given two languages L,L′ ⊆ Σ∗,
let LL′ := {ss′ ∈ Σ∗|s ∈ L ∧ s′ ∈ L′} denote the
concatenation of two sets. Let Σ′ ⊆ Σ. A mapping P :
Σ∗ → Σ′∗ is called the natural projection with respect
to (Σ,Σ′), if
(1) P () = ,
(2) (∀σ ∈ Σ)P (σ) :=
{
σ if σ ∈ Σ′,
 otherwise,
(3) (∀sσ ∈ Σ∗)P (sσ) = P (s)P (σ).
2
Given a language L ⊆ Σ∗, P (L) := {P (s) ∈ Σ′∗|s ∈ L}.
The inverse image mapping of P is
P−1 : 2Σ
′∗ → 2Σ∗ : L 7→ P−1(L) := {s ∈ Σ∗|P (s) ∈ L}.
A given target plant is modelled as a deterministic
finite-state automaton, G = (X,Σ, ξ, x0, Xm), where X
stands for the state set, Σ for the alphabet, ξ : X×Σ→
X for the (partial) transition function, x0 for the ini-
tial state and Xm ⊆ X for the marker state set. We
follow the notation in [26], and use ξ(x, σ)! to denote
that the transition ξ(x, σ) is defined. For each state
x ∈ X, let EnG(x) := {σ ∈ Σ|ξ(x, σ)!} be the set of
events enabled at x in G. The domain of ξ can be ex-
tended to X × Σ∗, where ξ(x, ) = x for all x ∈ X, and
ξ(x, sσ) := ξ(ξ(x, s), σ). The closed behaviour of G is
defined as L(G) := {s ∈ Σ∗|ξ(x0, s)!}, and the marked
behaviour of G is Lm(G) := {s ∈ L(G)|ξ(x0, s) ∈ Xm}.
G is nonblocking if Lm(G) = L(G). We will use N to de-
note natural numbers, |X| for the size of the state set
X, and |Σ| for the size of Σ. Given two finite-state au-
tomata Gi = (Xi,Σ, ξi, xi,0, Xi,m) (i = 1, 2), the meet
of G1 and G2, denoted as G1 ∧ G2, is a (reachable)
finite-state automaton whose alphabet is Σ such that
L(G1 ∧ G2) = L(G1) ∩ L(G2) and Lm(G1 ∧ G2) =
Lm(G1)∩Lm(G2). A sub-automaton of G is an automa-
ton Gsub = (X,Σ, ξsub, x0, Xm) such that
(∀x, x′ ∈ X)(∀σ ∈ Σ) ξsub(x, σ) = x′ ⇒ ξ(x, σ) = x′,
that is, each transition of Gsub must be a transition in
G, but the opposite may not be true. When the tran-
sition map is ξ : X × Σ → 2X , where 2X denotes the
power set of X, we call G a nondeterministic finite-state
automaton. If for each x ∈ X, there exists s ∈ Σ∗ such
that ξ(x, s) ∩ Xm 6= ∅, then G is co-reachable. For the
remainder of this paper, unless explicitly mentioned, all
automata are assumed to be deterministic.
We now recall the concept of supervisors. Let Σ =
Σc∪˙Σuc = Σo∪˙Σuo, where Σc (Σo) and Σuc (Σuo) are
disjoint, denoting respectively the sets of controllable
(observable) and uncontrollable (unobservable) events.
For notational simplicity, let Σo := Σo ∪ {}. Let Γ ={γ ⊆ Σ|Σuc ⊆ γ}, where each γ ∈ Γ is one control pat-
tern (or control command). A supervisory control map
of G under partial observation Po : Σ
∗ → Σ∗o is defined
as V : Po(L(G))→ Γ. Clearly,
(∀s ∈ L(G))(∀σ ∈ Σuc) sσ ∈ L(G)⇒ σ ∈ V (Po(s)),
namely the supervisory control map V never tries to
disable an uncontrollable transition. In addition,
(∀s, s′ ∈ L(G))Po(s) = Po(s′)⇒ V (Po(s)) = V (Po(s′)),
namely any two strings inL(G) that are observably iden-
tical, their induced control patterns are equal.
Let V/G denote the closed-loop system ofG under the
supervision of V , i.e.,
•  ∈ L(V/G),
• For all s ∈ L(V/G) and σ ∈ Σ
sσ ∈ L(V/G) ⇐⇒ sσ ∈ L(G) ∧ σ ∈ V (Po(s)),
• Lm(V/G) := Lm(G) ∩ L(V/G).
The control map V is finitely representable if V
can be described by a finite-state automaton, say
S = (Z,Σ, δ, zo, Zm = Z), such that
• L(S ∧G) = L(V/G) and Lm(S ∧G) = Lm(V/G),
• (∀s ∈ L(S))EnS(s) := {σ ∈ Σ|sσ ∈ L(S)} = V (s),
• (∀s, s′ ∈ L(S))Po(s) = Po(s′)⇒ δ(z0, s) = δ(z0, s′).
The last condition indicates that V (s) = EnS(s) =
EnS(s
′) = V (s′) if Po(s) = Po(s′). Such a supervisor S
can be computed by existing synthesis tools such as TCT
[30] or SuSyNA [31]. It has been shown that, as long as
a closed-loop language K ⊆ Lm(G) is controllable [23],
observable [22] and Lm(G)-closed, i.e., K = K∩Lm(G),
there always exists a finitely-representable supervisory
control map V such that Lm(V/G) = K and L(V/G) =
K. From now on we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1 V is nonblocking, i.e., L(V/G) =
Lm(V/G), and finitely representable by S. 2
We will use V or S interchangeably, depending on the
context. They will be called a (nonblocking) supervisor.
2.2 A smart sensor attack model
We assume that an attacker can intercept each ob-
servable event generated by the plant G, and replace it
by a sequence of observable events from Σ∗o, including
the empty string , in order to “fool” the given supervi-
sor V , which is known to the attacker. Considering that
in practice any event occurrence takes a non-negligible
amount of time, it is impossible for an attacker to insert
an arbitrarily long observable sequence to replace a re-
ceived observable event. Thus, we assume that there ex-
ists a known number n ∈ N such that the length of any
“reasonable” observable sequence that the attacker can
insert is no more than n. Let ∆n := {s ∈ Σ∗o||s| ≤ n} be
the set of all n-bounded observable sequences. A sensor
attack is a total map A : Po(L(G))→ ∆∗n, where
• A() = ,
• (∀s ∈ Po(L(G)))(∀σ ∈ Σo)A(sσ) ∈ A(s)∆n.
The first condition states that, before any observation
is obtained, the attack cannot generate any non-empty
output, because, otherwise, such a fake observation se-
quence may reveal the existence of an attack, if the plant
has not started yet, whose starting time is unknown to
the attacker. The second condition states that each re-
ceived observation σ ∈ Σo will trigger a fake string in
∆n. This model captures moves of insertion, deletion
and replacement introduced in, e.g., [11] [6] [12].
An attack model A is regular if there exists a finite-
state transducer A = (Y,Σo × ∆n, η, I, O, y0, Ym),
where Ym = Y , η : Y × Σo × ∆n → Y is the (par-
tial) transition map such that if η(y, σ, u)! and σ = 
then u = , i.e., if there is no observation input, then
there should be no observation output. The functions
I : (Σo × ∆n)∗ → Σ∗o and O : (Σo × ∆n)∗ → ∆∗n are
the input and output mappings, respectively, such that
for each µ = (a1, b1)(a2, b2) · · · (al, bl) ∈ (Σo × ∆n)∗,
I(µ) = a1a2 · · · al and O(µ) = b1b2 · · · bl. We require
that, for each µ ∈ L(A), we have A(I(µ)) = O(µ)
and I(L(A)) = Po(L(G)). Since A is a function, we
know that for all µ, µ′ ∈ L(A), if I(µ) = I(µ′), then
O(µ) = A(I(µ)) = A(I(µ′)) = O(µ′), that is, the same
input should result in the same output. Notice that,
in [9] [10], an attack model is directly introduced as a
finite-state transducer, which may not necessarily be
representable by an attack map A, because a finite-
3
transducer model allows nondeterminism, i.e., for the
same observation input, an attacker may choose different
attack moves, as long as they are allowed by the trans-
ducer model. In this sense, the attack model concerned
in this paper is a special case of the one introduced in
[9] [10], and bears more resemblance to the model in-
troduced in [12], as both treat an attack as a function.
But since there exists a nondeterministic attack model
if and only if there exists a deterministic one, the decid-
ability results derived in this paper shall be applicable
to nondeterministic attack models introduced in [9] [10].
Assumption 2 Only regular attacks are considered.
The combination of the attack A and the supervisor
V forms a new supervisor V ◦A : Po(L(G))→ Γ, where
(∀s ∈ Po(L(G)))V ◦A(s) := V (A(s)).
We call V ◦A an attacked supervisor under A. The closed
and marked behaviours,L(V ◦A/G) andLm(V ◦A/G), of
the closed-loop system V ◦A/G are defined accordingly.
We call L(V ◦A/G) the attacked language of V/G under
A. The closed-loop system is depicted in Figure 1.
Fig. 1. The block diagram of a plant under attack
Definition 1 Given a plant G and a supervisor V , let
Ldam ⊆ L(G) − L(V/G) be a damaging language. The
closed-loop system V/G is attackable with respect to
Ldam, if there exists an attack A, called a smart sensor
attack of V/G, such that the following conditions hold:
(1) Covertness: Event changes made by A are covert
to the supervisor V , i.e.,
A(Po(L(G))) ⊆ Po(L(V/G)). (1)
(2) Damage infliction: A causes “damage” to G, i.e.,
• strong attack: Any string may lead to damage:
L(V ◦A/G) = L(V ◦A/G) ∩ Ldam; (2)
• weak attack: Some string may lead to damage:
L(V ◦A/G) ∩ Ldam 6= ∅. (3)
(3) Control Feasibility: The closed-loop language
L(V ◦A/G) is observable with respect to (L(G), Po)
[22], i.e., for all s, s′ ∈ L(V ◦ A/G) and σ ∈ Σ, if
sσ ∈ L(V ◦ A/G), Po(s) = Po(s′) and s′σ ∈ L(G),
then s′σ ∈ L(V ◦A/G).
If V/G is not attackable with respect to Ldam, then V is
resilient to smart attacks with respect to Ldam. 2
The concept of attackability introduced in Def. 1 sim-
plifies the concept of attackability introduced in [10] by,
firstly, dropping the requirement of control existence,
as V ◦ A automatically allows all uncontrollable tran-
sitions, thus, ensuring controllability, and secondly, re-
placing the normality requirement with observability, as
we are not interested in supremal attack models here.
Let F(G,V, Ldam) be the collection of all attacked
languages caused by smart sensor attacks. Clearly,
(F(G,V, Ldam),⊆) is a partially ordered set, and by
Zorn’s lemma, we know that it has at least one max-
imal element, which is called a maximal attacked lan-
guage. When the last property of Control Feasibility is
strengthened by normality [22], and an attack model
A is nondeterministic, i.e., for the same observable in-
put, A may have more than one output choice, it has
been shown in [10] that (F(G,V, Ldam),⊆) becomes an
upper semilattice, and the supremal attacked language
L(V ◦A∗/G) exists such that for any smart sensor attack
A, we have L(V ◦ A/G) ⊆ L(V ◦ A∗/G). In this case,
the supremal strong attacked language is computable,
as shown in [10]. However, the synthesis of the supremal
weak attacked language is not addressed in [10].
3 A sufficient and necessary condition for the
existence of a smart sensor attack
Let us start with a small example, which is depicted in
Figure 2. Assume that the attacker A wants to achieve
Fig. 2. Example 1: A smart sensor attack
a string abc ∈ Ldam, which lead to a damaging state.
Assume that event a is contained in control pattern γ1,
event b is in control pattern γ2, and event c in control
pattern γ3. After event a fires, the attacker wants the
control pattern γ2 to be issued. Since event a does not
lead to control pattern γ2, but event d does, the attacker
A will replace event a with d to trick the supervisor S
to generate γ2. Assume that b is fired afterwards. The
attacker wants γ3 to be issued. Since event b does not
lead to γ3, instead, event e does, the attacker A replaces
event b with event e to trick the supervisor S to issue
γ3, if event c happens afterwards, the attacker achieves
his/her goal without being detected by the supervisor.
The attacker could continue this trick as long as it is pos-
sible. So essentially, by faking some observable string,
the attacker hopes to trick the supervisor to issue a se-
quence of control patterns, which contain some damag-
ing strings, without being detected by the supervisor.
We now generalize this idea. For notational simplicity,
given a string t = ν1 · · · νn ∈ Σ∗ with n ∈ N, for each
i ∈ {1, · · · , n}, we use ti to denote the prefix substring
ν1 · · · νi. By convention, t0 := .
Theorem 1 Given a plantG, a supervisor V and a dam-
aging language Ldam ⊆ L(G)−L(V/G), there is a smart
weak sensor attack A if and only if the following con-
dition holds: there exist s = u1σ1 · · ·urσrur+1 ∈ Ldam,
with r ∈ N, u1, · · · , ur+1 ∈ Σ∗uo and σ1, · · · , σr ∈ Σo,
and t = ν1 · · · νr ∈ Po(L(V/G)) with ν1, · · · , νr ∈ ∆n,
such that (1) u1, σ1 ∈ V (t0)∗; (2) for each i ∈ {2, · · · , r},
ui, σi ∈ V (ti−1)∗; (3) ur+1 ∈ V (t)∗. 2
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Proof: (1) We first show the IF part. Assume that
there exist s = u1σ1 · · ·urσrur+1 ∈ Ldam, with
r ∈ N, u1, · · · , ur+1 ∈ Σ∗uo and σ1, · · · , σr ∈ Σo,
and t = ν1 · · · νr ∈ Po(L(V/G)) with ν1, · · · , νr ∈
∆n, such that (1) u1, σ1 ∈ V (t0)∗; (2) for each
i ∈ {2, · · · , r}, ui, σi ∈ V (ti−1)∗; (3) ur+1 ∈ V (t)∗.
Clearly, we can design an attack model A such that
A(σi) := νi (i = 1, · · · , r) and for all other strings
s′ ∈ (Po(L(G))− {σ1 · · ·σr}) ∪ {}, we set
A(s′) :=
{
s′ if s′ ∈ Po(L(V/G)),
 otherwise.
Clearly, A(Po(L(G))) ⊆ Po(L(V/G)), i.e., A is covert.
In addition, A results in weak damage due to the exis-
tence of s. Finally, V ◦ A is clearly observable because
for each string s′′ ∈ Po(L(G)), V ◦ A(s′′) ∈ Γ, i.e., each
observable string s′′ ∈ Po(L(G)) is associated with only
one control pattern. Thus, by Def. 1, A is a smart weak
sensor attack.
(2) Next, we show the ONLY IF part. Assume
that there exists a smart weak sensor attack A. By
Def. 1, we know that A(Po(L(G)) ⊆ Po(L(V/G))
and L(V ◦ A/G) ∩ Ldam 6= ∅. Thus, there exists
s = u1σ1 · · ·urσrur+1 ∈ L(V ◦ A/G) ∩ Ldam with
r ∈ N, u1, · · · , ur+1 ∈ Σ∗uo and σ1, · · · , σr ∈ Σo,
such that A(Po(u1)) = , A(Po(u1)σ1) = ν1 ∈ ∆n;
A(Po(u1)σ1 · · ·Po(uj)) = A(Po(u1)σ1 · · ·Po(uj−1)σj−1)
and A(Po(u1)σ1 · · ·Po(uj)σj) = ν1 · · · νj for all
j ∈ {2, · · · , r} and νj ∈ ∆n; and finally,
A(Po(s)) = A(Po(u1)σ1 · · ·Po(ur)σr).
Let t = ν1 · · · νr. Since s ∈ L(V ◦A/G), by the definition
of L(V ◦A/G), we know that (1) u1, σ1 ∈ V (t0)∗; (2) for
each i ∈ {2, · · · , r}, ui, σi ∈ V (ti−1)∗; (3) ur+1 ∈ V (t)∗.
Thus, the theorem follows. 
As an illustration, in Example 1 depicted in Figure 2,
we can see that r = 3, σ1 = a, σ2 = b, σ3 = c, ν1 = d,
ν2 = e, u1 = u2 = u3 = u4 = .
The strings s and t in Theorem 1 forms a risky pair
(s, t) ∈ Ldam×∆∗n such that, by mapping Po(s) to t, the
attacker can rely on the existing supervisor V to inflict
a weak attack on the plant G, without being detected by
the supervisor. Since the existence of a risky pair is suf-
ficient and necessary for the existence of a smart weak
sensor attack, we will use this fact to determine the exis-
tence of a resilient supervisor. But before that, we would
like to state the following result about the decidability
of the existence of a regular smart weak sensor attack.
Theorem 2 Given a plant G, a regular supervisor V ,
and a regular damage language Ldam ⊆ L(G)−L(V/G),
the existence of a regular smart weak sensor attack is
decidable. 2
Proof: Since V is regular, there is a finite-state automa-
ton S = (Z,Σ, δ, z0, Zm = Z) that realizes V . We fol-
low an idea adopted from [10], and start with a single-
state transducer A = (Y,Σo ×∆n, η, I, O, y0, Ym = Y ),
where Y = {y0} and for all (σ, u) ∈ Σo × ∆n, we have
η(y0, σ, u) = y0. A contains all possible attack moves.
Since Ldam is regular, there exists a finite-state automa-
ton D = (W,Σ, κ, w0,Wm) such that L(D) = Σ
∗ and
Lm(D) = Ldam. We now form a combination of all rele-
vant finite-state transition structures. Let
Ψ = (N,ΣN , λ, n0, Nm),
where
• N = X × Z × Y ×W , Nm = Xm × Zm × Ym ×Wm;
• n0 = (x0, z0, y0, w0);
• ΣN := {(σ, σ′, u) ∈ Σ × Σo ×∆n|σ′ = Po(σ) ∧ [σ′ =
⇒ u = ]};
• λ : N×ΣN → N is the partial transition map: for each
(x, z, y, w), (x′, z′, y′, w′) ∈ N and (σ, σ′, u) ∈ ΣN ,
λ(x, z, y, w, σ, σ′, u) = (x′, z′, y′, w′)
if and only if the following conditions hold:
(1) σ ∈ EnS(z);
(2) δ(z, u)!;
(3) ξ(x, σ) = x′, δ(z, u) = z′, η(y, σ′, u) = y′, and
κ(w, σ) = w′.
Let the controllable alphabet of Ψ be
ΣN,c := ΣN ∩ (Σo × Σo ×∆n).
Let pi : Σ∗N → Σ∗ be a projection, where
• pi() = ;
• (∀(σ, σ′, u) ∈ ΣN )pi(σ, σ′, u) := σ;
• (∀sς ∈ Σ∗N )pi(sς) = pi(s)pi(ς).
Similarly, let $ : Σ∗N → ∆∗n be a projection, where
• $() = ;
• (∀(σ, σ′, u) ∈ ΣN )$(σ, σ′, u) := u;
• (∀sς ∈ Σ∗N )$(sς) = $(s)$(ς).
We calculate a controllable [23] prefix-closed sublan-
guage U ⊆ L(Ψ) w.r.t. Ψ and ΣN,uc := ΣN −ΣN,c, i.e.,
UΣN,uc ∩ L(Ψ) ⊆ U,
which satisfies the following properties:
• pi(U) ∩ Lm(D) 6= ∅;
• (∀s ∈ U)pi({ς ∈ ΣN |sς ∈ U}) = EnL(G)(pi(s)) ∩
EnS($(s));
• (∀s ∈ U)(∀t ∈ pi−1(P−1o (Po(pi(s))))∩U)$(s) = $(t).
We can check that Condition 1 of U states a weak
nonblocking property. Condition 2 is an “extended”
controllability property, which states that, after a string
s ∈ U , each outgoing transition ς ∈ ΣN is allowed, as
long as the plant G allows it, i.e., pi(ς) ∈ EnL(G)(pi(s)),
and the supervisor also allows it, i.e., pi(ς) ∈ EnS($(s)).
Because the supervisor allows all uncontrollable tran-
sitions, thus, no uncontrollable events in Σuc shall be
disabled here, which is the reason why we call it a
special controllability property. Condition 3 is an “ex-
tended” observability property, which states that any
two strings s and t, “observably” identical in the sense
that Po(pi(s)) = Po(pi(t)), must lead to the same ob-
servable strings in Σ∗o, i.e., $(s) = $(t), which, by the
property that two observably identical strings shall lead
to the same control pattern in the supervisor S, actually
states that Po(pi(s)) = Po(pi(t)) implies the same control
pattern - the latter is the classical concept of observabil-
ity. Based on this interpretation, by adopting either a
power set construction over Ψ via the projection Po ◦ pi
and a state pruning algorithm similar to the one pro-
posed in [24] that originally aims to compute a supremal
nonblocking supervisor with respect to Lm(D), that is
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state-controllable and state-normal, or one algorithm
proposed in [33] that computes a maximally control-
lable and observable nonblocking supervisor, we can
show that the existence of such a U is decidable.
To complete the proof, we only need to show that there
exists a regular smart weak sensor attack if and only if
there exists such a language U .
To show the IF part, we define an attack model A :
Po(L(G))→ ∆∗n, where
• (∀s ∈ U)A(Po(pi(s))) := $(s);
• for all s ∈ U and µ ∈ ΣN ,
sµ /∈ U ⇒ (∀t ∈ Σ∗N )A(Po(pi(sµt))) := A(Po(pi(s))).
Since for all s, t ∈ U , ifPo(pi(s)) = Po(pi(t)), then$(s) =
$(t), we know that A is a well defined map.
Next, we show that all conditions (1), (3) and the ob-
servability property stated in Def. 1 hold for A, meaning
that A is a smart weak sensor attack.
We first show that Condition (1) in Def. 1 holds,
i.e., A(Po(L(G))) ⊆ Po(L(S)). We first consider
all s ∈ U . Since U ⊆ L(Ψ), by the definition
of Ψ and Condition 2 of U , we write string s as
s = (t1, )(σ1, u1)(t2, )(σ2, u2) · · · (tr, )(σr, ur) ∈ U
with r ∈ N, σ1, · · · , σr ∈ Σo and t1, · · · tr ∈ Σ∗uo such
that ti ∈ V (u1 · · ·ui−1)∗ = (EnS(δ(z0, u1 · · ·ui−1)))∗
(i = 2, · · · , r) and t1 ∈ V ()∗ = (EnS(z0))∗. Thus,
$(s) = u1 · · ·ur ∈ L(S), in particular, u ∈ Po(L(S)), as
all unobservable transitions are self-looped in S. Thus,
A(Po(pi(s))) = $(s) ∈ Po(L(S)). For each string t ∈
L(G), there exists s′ ∈ pi−1(t) ∈ Σ∗N and, by the defini-
tion ofA, we haveA(Po(pi(s
′))) = A(Po(t)) ⊆ Po(L(S)).
Next, we show that Condition (3) in Def. 1 holds, that
is, L(V ◦ A/G) ∩ Ldam 6= ∅. To see this, notice that
L(V ◦ A/G) = pi(U) and since pi(U) ∩ Ldam 6= ∅, we
have L(V ◦A/G) ∩ Ldam 6= ∅.
Finally, since A is a well defined map, so is V ◦ A,
which maps Po(L(G)) to Γ, we know that L(V ◦ A/G)
is observable with respect to G and Po, namely Control
Feasibility condition in Def. 1 holds. Thus, A is a smart
weak sensor attack.
To show the ONLY IF part, assume that there exists
a regular smart weak sensor attack A represented by
a finite-transducer A = (Y,Σo ×∆n, η, I, O, y0, Y ). We
construct Ψ as shown above and let U = L(Ψ). Since
A is a smart weak sensor attack, conditions (1), (3) and
the observability property in Def. 1 hold. Clearly, U is
controllable and prefix closed. We know that pi(U) ∩
Ldam = L(V ◦ A/G) ∩ Ldam 6= ∅, due to Condition (3)
in Def. 1. Due to the covertness condition in Def. 1, we
know that, for all s ∈ U , we have $(s) ∈ L(S). By the
definition of U , we know that
pi({ς ∈ ΣN |sς ∈ U}) = EnL(G)(pi(s)) ∩ EnS($(s)).
Finally, because the attack model A : Po(L(G)) → ∆∗n
is a map, which maps all strings observably identical
to the same observable string acceptable by S, by the
definition of U , we have
(∀s ∈ U)(∀t ∈ pi−1(P−1o (Po(pi(s)))) ∩ U)$(s) = $(t).
Thus, all required conditions for U hold. This com-
pletes the proof. 
In some sense, Theorem 2 is not surprising. In [12]
the authors have shown that an attack function that en-
sures the covertness and weak damage infliction can al-
ways be synthesized, when it exists. But since the attack
model adopted in this paper is not completely the same
as the one used in [12], e.g., the latter does not requires
A() =  (thus, non-existence of an attack model in our
definition does not necessarily means the non-existence
of an attack model in [12]), and no observability is ex-
plicitly imposed, and encoding of attack moves is differ-
ent, Theorem 2 has its own value by providing another
way of synthesizing a regular smart weak sensor attack
model, whenever it exists. However, we do not claim it
as one major contribution.
4 Supervisor resilient to smart sensor attacks
In this section we explore whether there exists a suf-
ficient and necessary condition to ensure the existence
of a supervisor that is resilient to all regular smart sen-
sor attacks, i.e., the closed-loop system is not attack-
able by any regular smart sensor attack. In Section 3
we have shown that there is a sufficient and necessary
condition for the existence of a smart weak sensor at-
tack shown in Theorem 1. Since each strong attack is
also a weak attack, if we can effectively eliminate those
risky pairs described in Theorem 1, we shall be able to
prevent the existence of any smart sensor attack. Since,
given a plant G and a requirement Spec, we can always
synthesize a controllable and observable sublanguage of
Lm(G) ∩ Lm(Spec), without loss of generality, we as-
sume that the plant G satisfies all given requirements.
Thus, we will only focus on the following problem.
Problem 1 Given a plant G and a damaging language
Ldam ⊆ L(G), synthesize a supervisor V such that V/G
is not attackable by any regular smart sensor attack with
respect to Ldam. 2
To solve this problem, we first intend to find a proper
way of encoding all risky pairs. Given a string s ∈ Σ∗,
we use s↑ to denote the last event of s. If s = , by con-
vention, s↑ := . In addition, we use so to denote the
longest prefix substring of s, whose last event is observ-
able, i.e., so ∈ {s} ∩ (Σ∗uoΣo)∗ ∩ P−1o (Po({s})). Thus, if
s ∈ Σ∗uo, then we can derive that so = .
Let ι : Σ∗ → 2(Σ×Γ)∗ be a partial mapping, where
• ι() := ;
• (∀s ∈ Σ∗)(∀σ ∈ Σ) ι(sσ) := ι(s){(σ, γ)|σ ∈ γ}.
In Example 1, we have (a, γ1)(b, γ2)(c, γ3) ∈ ι(abc).
What the map ι does is to map each string s ∈ Σ∗ to
a set of sequences of control patterns such that each
derived control pattern sequence, say γ1 · · · γr ∈ Γ∗,
contains the string s in the sense that s ∈ γ1 · · · γr ⊆ Σ∗.
By applying the map ι to the damaging language Ldam,
the result ι(Ldam) := ∪s∈Ldamι(s) presents all possible
sequences of control patterns, each of which contains at
least one string in Ldam - in other words, each string in
ι(Ldam) may potentially result in damage.
To further illustrate how this function works, we intro-
duce another simple example depicted in Figure 3, where
Σ = {a, b, c, d, v}, Σc = {a, b, d} and Σo = {a, b, c, d}.
To simplify our analysis, we assume that ∆n = Σ

o, i.e.,
n = 1. The damaging language Ldam = {ad}, which is
shown by a dashed line leading to state 3. Figure 4 de-
picts the outcome of applying ι on L(G).
A smart sensor attack can replace each intercepted
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Fig. 3. Example 2: A small plant G
Fig. 4. Example 2: The model of ι(L(G))
observable event σ ∈ Σo with a string in ∆n, unless
the intercepted event σ is either silent, i.e., σ =  or a
protected observable event from a special set Σo,p ⊆ Σo,
which cannot be attacked. To capture the impact of such
changes on the control pattern sequences, we introduce
another map ψ : (Σ× Γ)∗ → 2((Σ∪∆n)×Γ)∗ , where
• ψ() := ;
• For each µ ∈ (Σ× Γ)∗ and (σ, γ) ∈ Σ× Γ, we have
ψ(µ(σ, γ)) :=
{
ψ(µ){(σ, γ)} if σ ∈ Σo,p ∪ Σuo,
ψ(µ)(∆n × {γ}) otherwise.
We extend the domain of ψ to languages in the usual
way, i.e., for all L ⊆ (Σ× Γ)∗, ψ(L) := ∪s∈Lψ(s).
To explicitly describe how a smart attack may utilize
possible sequences of control patterns in ζ(L(G)), we
introduce one more mapping
ν : ((Σ ∪∆n)× Γ)∗ → 2(Σo×Γ)∗ ,
where
• ν() := ;
• For all (σ, γ) ∈ (Σ ∪ {})× Γ,
ν(σ, γ) =

(σ, γ) if σ ∈ Σo ∧ σ ∈ γ;
(, γ) if σ ∈ Σuo ∧ σ ∈ γ;
∅ otherwise.
• For all s = σ1 · · ·σr ∈ ∆n, Po(s) = r ≥ 2, and γ ∈ Γ,
ν(s, γ) := {(σ1, γ1) · · · (σr, γ)|σr ∈ γ∧
(∀i ∈ {1, · · · , r − 1})σi ∈ γr−1 ∈ Γ}.
• (∀µ(s, γ) ∈ ((Σ∪∆n)×Γ)+) ν(µ(s, γ)) = ν(µ)ν(s, γ).
As an illustration, we apply the map ψ to the dam-
aging language ι(Ldam) in Figure 4, where n = 1 and
Σo,p = {c, d}. The outcome is depicted in Figure 5. No-
tice that when event a is intercepted by the attacker,
it can be replaced by any other strings in ∆n. Because
n = 1, we have ∆1 = Σo ∪{} = {a, b, c, d, }. But when
event d is intercepted, because d ∈ Σo,p, it cannot be
replaced with other strings in ∆n. In addition, because
n = 1, the outcome of ν(ψ(ι(L(G)))) equals ψ(ι(L(G))).
Next, we determine all control pattern sequences in
the plant G that may be used by a smart attack. Let
Fig. 5. Example 2: The model of ψ(ι(L(G)))
ΥG : L(G)×Σ∗ × Γ→ {0, 1} be a Boolean map, where
for each (s, t, γ) ∈ L(G)× Σ∗ × Γ,
ΥG(s, t, γ) = 1 ⇐⇒ st ∈ L(G) ∧ t ∈ γ∗.
For each γ ∈ Γ, let
B(γ) :=
{
{(, γ)}∗ if γ ∩ Σuo 6= ∅,
{} otherwise.
Let p : (Σo × Γ)∗ → Γ∗ be a projection map, where
• p() := ;
• (∀s(σ, γ) ∈ (Σo × Γ)+) p(s(σ, γ)) := p(s)γ.
And let g : (Σo × Γ)∗ → Σ∗o be a projection map, where
• g() := ;
• (∀µ(σ, γ) ∈ (Σo × Γ)+) g(µ(σ, γ)) := g(µ)Po(σ).
Let ζ : L(G)→ 2(Σo×Γ)∗ be a total mapping, where
• ζ() := ⋃γ∈Γ:γ∩Σuo 6=∅{(, γ)}+⋃γ∈Γ:γ⊆Σo{(, γ)};
• For all s ∈ (Σ∗uoΣo)∗ and t ∈ Σ∗uoΣo with st ∈ L(G),
ζ(st) := ζ(s)M , where M = {} if Po(t) = ; other-
wise,
M :=
⋃
w∈ζ(s):ΥG(s,t,p(w)↑)=1
⋃
γ′∈Γ
{w(Po(t), γ′)}B(γ′).
We call ζ(L(G)) the augmented closed behaviour of G.
The augmented marked behaviour of G induced by ζ is
defined as ζ(L(G)) ∩ g−1(Po(Lm(G))).
This definition of ζ indicates that, except for control
patterns generated initially, i.e., when s = , each control
pattern will be changed only after an observable event
is received, i.e., when st ∈ Σ∗Σo ∩ L(G). This matches
the definition of a supervisor V that changes its output
only when a new observation is received. In addition, if
a control pattern γ contains unobservable events, it will
be contained in a self-loop of the augmented event (, γ),
i.e., {(, γ)}∗, denoting that the control pattern γ may
be used more than once by the plant, as long as no new
observable event has been received. Again, this matches
the Ramadge-Wonham supervisory control paradigm,
where execution of any unobservable transition allowed
by the current control pattern will not change the cur-
rent control pattern - recall that in a finite-state automa-
ton realization of V , unobservable events are self-looped
at relevant states.
As an illustration, we apply ζ to the plant model L(G)
depicted in Figure 3. Part of the outcome is depicted in
Figure 6. Because the total state set isX×Σo×Γ, which
is too big to be shown entirely in the picture, we only
include states that have at least one future extension,
unless they are marker states, except for one blocking
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Fig. 6. Example 2: The model of ζ(L(G))
state (2, b, {v, c}), which is left there for an illustration
purpose that will be explained shortly. The marker states
in Figure 6 denotes the augmented marked behaviour of
G in Example 2.
Till now, we have provide sufficient means to describe
all risky pairs, which are captured by ν(ψ(ι(Ldam)))
at the attacker’s demand side, and ζ(L(G)) at the
plant’s supply side. To avoid such risky pairs, we only
need to remove p−1(p(ν(ψ(ι(Ldam))))(Σo × Γ)∗ from
ζ(L(G)). The reason why we concatenate (Σo × Γ)∗ at
the end of p−1(p(ν(ψ(ι(Ldam)))) is to denote all possi-
ble augmented strings that may contain some strings in
p−1(p(ν(ψ(ι(Ldam)))) as prefix substrings. Thus, all safe
supervisory control pattern sequences shall be contained
in Hˆ := ζ(L(G)) − p−1(p(ν(ψ(ι(Ldam))))(Σo × Γ)∗ in
order to prevent any sequence of control patterns from
being used by an attacker.
Figure 7 depicts the outcome of subtracting risky con-
Fig. 7. Example 2: The model of Hˆ
trol pattern sequences p−1(p(ν(ψ(ι(Ldam))))(Σo × Γ)∗
from (part of) ζ(L(G)) shown in Figure 6. It is clear
that there cannot be any sequence of control patterns
γ1γ2 · · · γl such that a ∈ γ1 and d ∈ γ2.
To extract a proper supervisor from Hˆ, we need a few
more technical preparations. Let H := Hˆ ⊆ (Σo × Γ)∗
be the prefix closure of Hˆ. We consider all tuples (σ, γ) ∈
Σo × Γ to be controllable, except for tuples {} × Γ.
We introduce the concept of conditional controllability
inspired by the standard notion of controllability in [27].
Definition 2 A sublanguage L ⊆ H is conditionally
controllable with respect to ζ(L(G)) and {} × Γ, if
(L− {})({} × Γ) ∩ ζ(L(G)) ⊆ L. 2
In other words, as long as (, γ) is not defined at the be-
ginning, i.e., (, γ) /∈ ζ(L(G)), it should not be disabled,
if it follows a non-empty string s ∈ L. We can briefly
explain the motivation as follows. If an event (, γ) does
not appear at the beginning, by the definition of ζ(L(G))
and subsequently that of H, it must be incurred by an-
other string s(σ, γ) such that γ ∩ Σuo 6= ∅ – clearly, we
can stop (σ, γ), if σ 6= , by not choosing γ; but after
γ is chosen and some unobservable event allowed by γ
occurs, the same control pattern γ will continuously re-
main active, i.e., (, γ) will still be allowed, until a new
observation is generated, leading to a new control pat-
tern. But the situation is different initially, as we can di-
rectly disable the control pattern γ, thus stop the event
(, γ). It is clear that conditional controllability is also
closed under set union.
Let C(ζ(L(G)), H) be the set of all prefix-closed
sublanguages of H, which is conditionally controllable
with respect to ζ(L(G)) and {} × Γ. It is clear that
the supremal conditionally controllable sublanguage
in C(ζ(L(G)), H) under the partial order of set in-
clusion exists. We denote this unique sublanguage as
S∗ := supC(ζ(L(G)), H). Notice that S∗ contains no
sequence of control patterns that may be used by a
smart attack to inflict damage. Later, we will show that
S∗ contains all feasible supervisors that are resilient to
smart sensor attacks, as long as such a supervisor ex-
ists. We now introduce techniques to extract a feasible
resilient supervisor out of S∗, if it exists. To this end,
we introduce a few more concepts.
Let f : S∗ → 2X be a mapping, where
• For all (, γ) ∈ S∗,
f(, γ) := {x ∈ X|(∃t ∈ γ∗ ∩ Σ∗uoΣo)ξ(x0, t) = x};
• For all s ∈ S∗ and (σ, γ) ∈ Σo × Γ with s(σ, γ) ∈ S∗,
if σ = , then f(s(σ, γ)) := f(s); otherwise,
f(s(σ, γ)) :=
{x ∈ X|(∃t ∈ γ∗ ∩ Σ∗uoΣo)(∃x′ ∈ f(s))ξ(x′, σt) = x}.
The map f essentially associates each string s ∈ S∗
with the corresponding state estimate of G. Let
h : S∗ → 2X be the marking coreachability map
associated with the plant G, where for each s =
(, γ0)(σ1, γ1) · · · (σn, γn) ∈ S∗ with n ∈ N,
• f(s) ∩Xm = ∅⇒ h(s) = ∅;
• If f(s) ∩ Xm 6= ∅, then let % : 2X × Γ → 2X , where
for all U ∈ 2X and γ ∈ Γ,
%(U, γ) :=
{x ∈ X|(∃t ∈ γ∗ ∩ Σ∗uoΣo)(∃x′ ∈ U)ξ(x, t) = x′},
and h(s) := ∪ni=0Ui, where· Un := %(f(s) ∩Xm, γn);
· (∀i ∈ {0, · · · , n− 1})Ui := %(Ui+1, γi).
Definition 3 A resilient supervisor candidate L ⊆ S∗
is nonblocking with respect to G, if for all s ∈ L,
f(s) ⊆
⋃
t∈L:s≤t
h(t).
2
Definition 4 A sublanguage L ∈ C(ζ(L(G)), H) is a
nonblocking resilient supervisor candidate if for all s ∈ L,
(1) (∀t ∈ g−1(g(s)) ∩ L)p(t)↑ = p(s)↑;
8
(2) EnL(s) = (Po(p(s↑))× Γ) ∩ Enζ(L(G))(s);
(3) L is nonblocking with respect to G. 2
Notice that t ∈ g−1(g(s)) ∩ L means that g(s) = g(t),
and p(t)↑ = p(s)↑ means that the incurred control pat-
terns by g(t) and g(s) are the same. Thus, the first con-
dition in Def. 4 essentially states that, all observably
identical strings must lead to the same control pattern
– consequently, any silent transition  cannot generate
any new control pattern other than the current one. The
second condition states that each augmented event in
Σo × Γ allowed by the augmented plant ζ(L(G)), if its
observable event in Σo is allowed by the control pattern
incurred by s, i.e., Po(p(s
↑)), must be allowed in L. The
last condition refers to nonblockingness of L.
As an illustration, we calculate supC(ζ(L(G)), H) and
remove all states that either violate the second condition
of Def. 4 or are blocking. Figure 8 depicts the outcome.
Fig. 8. Example 2: The set of all nonblocking resilient super-
visor candidates of S∗
We can see that the state (2, b, {v, c}) in Figure 7 needs
to be removed because it is blocking, violating the third
condition in Def. 4. In addition, states (0, , {a, b, v, c})
and (0, , {a, b, d, v, c}) and (0, , {a, d, v, c}) in Figure 7
also need to be removed because they clearly violate
the second condition of Def. 4, as the event b is de-
fined in control patterns {a, b, v, c} and {a, b, d, v, c} of
states (0, , {a, b, v, c}) and (0, , {a, b, d, v, c}), respec-
tively, but no outgoing transitions contain b are allowed
at these two states in H, even though these transitions
are allowed in ζ(L(G)), and event d is defined in the con-
trol pattern {a, d, v, c} of state (0, , {a, d, v, c}), but no
outgoing transition containing d is allowed in H, even
though such a transition is allowed in ζ(L(G)).
We now state the following theorem, which is the first
step towards solving the decidability problem of the ex-
istence of a supervisor resilient to smart sensor attacks.
Theorem 3 Given a plant G and a damaging language
Ldam ⊆ L(G), let S∗ be defined above. Then there ex-
ists a supervisor V : Po(L(G)) → Γ such that V/G is
not attackable w.r.t. Ldam , if and only if there exists a
nonblocking resilient supervisor candidate L ⊆ S∗. 2
Proof: (1) We first show the IF part. Assume that there
exists a nonblocking resilient supervisor candidate L ⊆
S∗. For each s ∈ Po(L(G)), if s /∈ g(L) then let V (s) :=
Σuc; otherwise, for any u ∈ g−1(s) ∩ L, let V (s) :=
[p(u)]↑. For the latter case, we first show that V (s) is
well defined. Assume that it is not true, then there exist
u1, u2 ∈ g−1(s) ∩ L such that u1 6= u2 and [p(u1)]↑ 6=
[p(u2)]
↑. But this violates Condition 1 of Def. 4, thus,
contradicts our assumption that L is a nonblocking re-
silient supervisor candidate. So V must be well defined,
that is, for each s ∈ Po(L(G)), V (s) is uniquely defined.
Secondly, since [p(u)]↑ is a control pattern for u ∈
g−1(s) ∩ L, it is clear that V (s) ∈ Γ. Since V maps all
strings observably identical to a same control pattern,
we know that L(V/G) is observable. Finally, by the third
condition of Def. 4, it is clear that L is nonblocking. By
the construction of L, we know that g(L) = L(V/G).
Thus, by the third condition of Def. 4, we have that
V is a nonblocking supervisory control map. Clearly, V
does not allow any weak sensor attack damage. Thus,
it is resilient to any smart sensor attack, regardless of
whether the attack is a strong or weak one.
(2) We now show the ONLY IF part. Assume that there
exists a supervisor V , which does not allow any smart
sensor attack. Since each strong attack is also a weak
attack, we will only need to consider weak sensor attacks.
We define the following language L induced from V :
•  ∈ L;
• (, V ()) ∈ L;
• For all s ∈ L,
· p(s)↑ ∩ Σuo 6= ∅ ⇐⇒ {s}{(, p(s)↑)}∗ ⊆ L;
· for all σ′ ∈ Po(p(s)↑) ∩ Σo and γ ∈ Γ,
(σ′, γ) ∈ Enζ(L(G))(s)⇒ s(σ′, V (g(s)σ′)) ∈ L;
• All strings in L are generated in Steps (1)-(3).
Clearly, L ⊆ ζ(L(G)). Because V is a resilient supervi-
sor, by Theorem 1 we know thatL ⊆ H - otherwise, there
must exist a smart weak attack. By the construction of
L, we know that L is conditionally controllable with re-
spect to ζ(L(G)) and {}×Γ. Thus, L ∈ C(ζ(L(G)), H),
namely, L ⊆ S∗. Since V is a nonblocking supervisor, we
can check that all three conditions in Def. 4 hold. Thus,
L is a nonblocking resilient supervisor candidate, which
completes the proof. 
As an illustration, we can check that any marked se-
quence in Figure 8 is a nonblocking resilient supervi-
sor candidate. For example, take a look at the sub-
language L := {(, {a, v, c})}+{(a, {v, c})}{(, {v, c})}∗
{(c, {v, c})}{(, {v, c})}∗. We can check that L is condi-
tional controllable with respect to ζ(L(G)) and {}×Γ.
Thus, L ∈ C(ζ(L(G)), H). In addition, L is nonblock-
ing and satisfies conditions in Def. 4. Thus, L is a non-
blocking resilient supervisor candidate of S∗. By Theo-
rem 3, we know that there must exist a resilient super-
visor V that does not allow any smart sensor attack.
Based on the construction shown in the proof of Theo-
rem 3, the corresponding supervisor is V () := {a, v, c},
V (a) := {v, c} and V (ac) := {v, c}. For any other ob-
servable string s ∈ Po(L(G)), we simply set V (s) := Σuc.
Theorem 3 indicates that, to decide whether there ex-
ists a nonblocking supervisor that disallows smart sen-
sor attacks, we only need to decide whether there ex-
ists a nonblocking resilient supervisor candidate L ⊆ S∗.
Next, we shall discuss how to determine the existence of
such a language L.
5 Decidability of the existence of a supervisor
resilient to smart sensor attacks
In the previous section we present a sufficient and nec-
essary condition for the existence of a resilient supervi-
sor. However, the computability issue is not addressed.
In this section, we discuss how to compute all those sets
and languages introduced in the previous section, and
eventually show how to decide the existence of a resilient
supervisor, i.e., to decide when that sufficient and neces-
sary condition mentioned in Theorem 3 holds for a given
plant G and a regular damaging language Ldam.
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We first discuss how to compute ι(Ldam). As shown
in Section 4, let D = (W,Σ, κ, w0,Wm) recognize Ldam,
i.e., Lm(D) = Ldam. We construct another finite-state
automaton Dι := (W,Σ × Γ, κι, w0,Wm), where κι :
W × Σ × Γ → W is the (partial) transition map such
that for each (w, σ, γ) ∈W × Σ× Γ and w′ ∈W ,
κι(w, σ, γ) = w
′ ⇐⇒ σ ∈ γ ∧ κ(w, σ) = w′.
Proposition 1 ι(Ldam) = Lm(Dι). 2
Proof: It is clear from the construction of Dι. 
Next, we describe how to calculate ψ(ι(Ldam)). Let
Dψ = (W, (Σ ∪∆n) × Γ, κψ, w0,Wm), where κψ : W ×
(Σ ∪∆n)× Γ→W is the (partial) transition map such
that for each (w, u, γ) ∈W × (Σ∪∆n)×Γ and w′ ∈W ,
we have κψ(w, u, γ) = w
′ if one of the following holds:
• u ∈ Σo,p ∪ Σuo ∧ κι(w, u, γ) = w′;
• u ∈ ∆n − Σo,p ∧ (∃σ ∈ Σo − Σo,p)κι(w, σ, γ) = w′.
Proposition 2 ψ(ι(Ldam)) = Lm(Dψ). 2
Proof: By the construction of Dψ and the definition of
ψ, the proposition follows. ,
Next, we describe how to calculate ν(ψ(ι(L(G)))) by
modifying Dψ. For each transition κψ(w, u, γ) = w
′,
if u ∈ ∆n − Σo,p and |u| ≥ 2, we make the follow-
ing changes to Dψ. Assume that u = σ1 · · ·σr with
r ∈ N and σi ∈ Σo (i ∈ {1, · · · , r}). We create r − 1
new states w˜1, · · · , w˜r−1 such that for each sequence
γ1 · · · γr−1 ∈ Γ∗ with σi ∈ γi (i = 1, · · · , r), we de-
fine κψ(w, σ1, γ1) = w˜1, κψ(w˜i, σi+1, γi+1) = w˜i+1 (i =
1, · · · , r − 2) and κψ(w˜r−1, σr, γ) = w′. Add newly cre-
ated states to the state set W of Dψ and new transitions
to κψ. Continue this process until all transitions are pro-
cessed. Let the final finite-state automaton be Dν .
Proposition 3 ν(ψ(ι(Ldam))) = Lm(Dν). 2
Proof: By the construction of Dν and the definition of
ν, the proposition follows. 
Next, we will show how to compute ζ(L(G)). We con-
struct a nondeterministic finite-state automaton Gζ :=
(X × Σo × Γ,Σo × Γ, ξζ , (x0, ,Σ), Xm × Σo), where
ξζ : X × Σo × Γ× Σo × Γ→ 2X×Σ

o×Γ
is the nondeterministic transition map such that
• For all γ ∈ Γ, ξζ(x0, ,Σ, , γ) := {(x0, , γ)};
• For all (x, σ, γ) ∈ X × Σo × Γ − {(x0, ,Σ)}, and
(σ′, γ′) ∈ Σo × Γ, we have that· if σ′ =  and γ′ = γ and γ ∩ Σuo 6= ∅, then
ξζ(x, σ, γ, , γ) = {(x, σ, γ)};
· if σ′ ∈ Σo, then
ξζ(x, σ, γ, σ
′, γ′) := {(x′, σ′, γ′) ∈ X × Σo × Γ|
(∃u ∈ P−1o (σ′) ∩ γ∗ ∩ (Σ∗uoΣo)∗)ξ(x, u) = x′}.
To illustrate the construction procedure for Gζ ,
a small example is depicted in Figure 9, where
Σ = {a, b, c, v}, Σc = {a} and Σo = {a, b, c}. Thus,
there are only two control patterns γ1 = {a, b, v, c} and
γ2 = Σuc = {b, v, c}. The outcome ofGζ is shown in Fig-
ure 9, where nondeterministic transitions occur at both
(augmented) states (1, a, {b, v, c}) and (1, a, {a, b, v, c}).
Proposition 4 ζ(L(G)) = L(Gζ). 2
Fig. 9. Example 3: A plant G and the corresponding Gζ
Proof: By the definition of ζ and the construction of Gζ ,
it is clear that ζ(L(G)) ⊆ L(Gζ). So we only need to show
that L(Gζ) ⊆ ζ(L(G)). We use induction. At the initial
state (x0, ,Σ), for each γ ∈ Γ, if γ ∩ Σuo 6= ∅, we have
κζ(x0, ,Σ, , γ) = {(x0, , γ)} and κζ(x0, , γ, , γ) =
{(x0, , γ)}), namely {(, γ)}+ ⊆ L(Gζ). By the defini-
tion of ζ(L(G)), we know that {(, γ)}+ ⊆ ζ(L(G)). If γ∩
Σuo = ∅, then we have κζ(x0, ,Σ, , γ) = {(x0, , γ)},
namely (, γ) ∈ L(Gζ). By the definition of ζ(L(G)), we
know that (, γ) ∈ ζ(L(G)). Thus, the base case holds.
Assume that s ∈ ζ(L(G))∩L(Gζ), and s(σ, γ) ∈ L(Gζ),
we need to show that s(σ, γ) ∈ ζ(L(G)). If σ = ,
then since s(σ, γ) ∈ L(Gζ), we know that γ = p(s)↑
and γ ∩ Σuo 6= ∅. Since s ∈ ζ(L(G)) and p(s)↑ = γ
and γ ∩ Σuo 6= ∅, we know that s(, γ) ∈ ζ(L(G)). If
σ ∈ Σo, then clearly there exists tu ∈ L(G) such that
g(s) = Po(t) and u ∈ P−1o (σ)∩p(s)∗∩(Σ∗uoΣo)∗. Clearly,
s ∈ ζ(t) and Po(u) = σ 6= . Thus, by the definition of
ζ(L(G)), we know that s(Po(u), γ) = s(σ, γ) ∈ ζ(L(G)).
Thus, the induction holds, which completes the proof. 
Notice that in Gζ , except for being at the initial state
(x0, ,Σ), no transition between two different states can
be unobservable.
Since the map p introduced before is a projec-
tion, it is not difficult to check that Hˆ = ζ(L(G)) −
p−1(p(ν(ψ(ι(Ldam)))))(Σo × Γ)∗ is regular, as both
ζ(L(G)) and ν(ψ(ι(Ldam))) are shown to be regular.
Thus, its prefix closure H := Hˆ is also regular. Let
the alphabet be Σo × Γ and the uncontrollable al-
phabet be {} × Γ. Since Gζ is nondeterministic, H
can be recognized by a nondeterministic automaton,
without masking out necessary marking information
inherited from G, which will be used later. By us-
ing a synthesis algorithm similar to the one proposed
in [24] [25], which is realized in [31], we can show
that S∗ = supC(ζ(L(G)), H) is also regular, and gen-
erated by a nondeterministic finite-state automaton
H := (Q,Σo×Γ,Ξ, q0, Qm), where Q = X×Σo×Γ×R
and Qm = Xm ×Σo × Γ×R with R being the state set
of the recognizer of p−1(p(ν(ψ(ι(Ldam)))))(Σo × Γ)∗.
That is S∗ = L(H). Next, we will develop a compu-
tational method to determine whether a nonblocking
resilient supervisor candidate in S∗ exists.
To handle partial observation induced by g, we under-
take the following subset-construction style operation on
H. Let P(H) = (QP ,Σo × Γ,ΞP , q0,P , Qm,P), where
• QP := Σo × 2Q ×Q, Qm,P := Σo × 2Q ×Qm;
• q0,P := (, {q ∈ Q|(∃t ∈ g−1())q ∈ Ξ(q0, t)}, q0);
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• The transition map ΞP : QP×Σo×Γ→ 2QP is defined
as follows: for each (σ, U, q) ∈ QP and (σ′, γ) ∈ Σo×Γ,
if σ′ = , then
ΞP(σ, U, q, , γ) := {σ} × {U} × Ξ(q, , γ);
otherwise, we have
ΞP(σ, U, q, σ′, γ) := {σ′} × Ξ(U, σ′, γ)× Ξ(q, σ′, γ),
where
Ξ(U, σ′, γ) :=
{qˆ ∈ QP |(∃q˜ ∈ U)(∃t ∈ g−1(Po(σ′)))qˆ ∈ Ξ(q˜, t)}.
Remarks: It is clear that L(P(H)) = L(H) = S∗.
In addition, since all unobservable transitions in Gζ are
selflooped at relevant states, by the construction of S∗,
we can check that the recognizer H also selfloops all
unobservable transitions. Due to this property, we have
ΞP(σ, U, q, , γ) := {σ}×{U}×Ξ(q, , γ) in the definition
of P(H), where Ξ(q, , γ) either equals {q} or ∅ in H.
To illustrate the construction procedure for P(H), as-
sume that in Example 3 depicted in Figure 9, H = Gζ .
After applying the construction procedure for P(H), the
Fig. 10. Example 3: The model of P(H)
outcome is depicted in Figure 10, where
U0 = {q0,P , (0, , {a, b, v, c}), (0, , {b, v, c})};
U1 = {(1, a, {a, b, v, c}), (1, a, {b, v, c})};
U2 = {(2, b, {a, b, v, c}), (2, b, {b, v, c})};
U3 = {(3, c, {a, b, v, c}), (3, c, {b, v, c}), (5, c, {a, b, v, c}),
(5, c, {b, v, c})};
U4 = {(7, c, {a, b, v, c}), (7, c, {b, v, c})}.
Definition 5 Given P(H), a reachable sub-automaton
Ω = (QΩ ⊆ QP ,Σo × Γ,ΞΩ, q0,P , Qm,Ω ⊆ Qm,P) ofP(H) is control feasible if the following conditions hold:
(1) For all q = (σ, U, x, σ, γ, r) ∈ QΩ with q 6= q0,P ,
(∀γ′ ∈ Γ) ξζ(x, σ, γ, , γ′) 6= ∅⇒ ΞΩ(q, , γ′) 6= ∅;
(2) For all (σ, U, x1, σ, γ1, r1), (σ, U, x2, σ, γ2, r2) ∈ QΩ,
we have γ1 = γ2;
(3) For each q = (σ, U, x, σ, γ, r) ∈ QΩ,
EnΩ(q) = (Po(γ)× Γ) ∩ EnGζ (x, σ, γ);
(4) For all (σ, U, q) ∈ QΩ and µ ∈ Σo × Γ, if
ΞΩ(σ, U, q, µ) 6= ∅, then for all (σ, U, q′) ∈ QP ,
ΞΩ(σ, U, q
′, µ) = ΞP(σ, U, q′, µ) ⊆ QΩ;
(5) Ω is co-reachable. 2
The first condition in Def. 5 essentially states that in
Ω no uncontrollable transitions allowed by Gζ shall be
disabled, which is similar to the concept of state con-
trollability in [24] that handles nondeterministic transi-
tions. Based on the construction of P(H), if (, γ′) is al-
lowed at state q = (σ, U, x, σ, γ, r) in Ω, then γ′ = γ and
ΞΩ(q, , γ) = {q}. The second condition states that all
strings observably identical in L(Ω) must result in the
same control pattern. The third condition states that,
for any state in Ω, each augmented event allowed both by
the augmented plant Gζ and the corresponding control
pattern γ associated with that state must be allowed in
Ω. The fourth condition is similar to the concept of state
observability in [24] to handle nondeterminism, which
requires that all states in P(H) reachable by strings ob-
servably identical to some string in L(Ω), must be in-
cluded in Ω. The last condition is self-explained.
As an illustration, Figure 11 depicts one choice of Ω
derived from P(H) in Example 3. We can see that clearly
Fig. 11. Example 3: A model containing one Ω
no self-looped uncontrollable events are disabled. So the
first condition in Def. 5 holds. Due to the second condi-
tion in Def. 5, in U0 we choose to keep γ = {a, b, v, c},
and thus, only states q0,P and (, U0, 0, , {a, b, v, c})
will be kept in Ω. Similarly, in U1 the control pat-
tern γ = {b, v, c} is chosen; in U2 the control pattern
γ = {a, b, v, c} is chosen; inU3 the pattern γ = {a, b, v, c}
is chosen; and in U4 the pattern γ = {b, v, c} is cho-
sen. Due to the third condition in Def. 5, we can see
that in U0 both outgoing transitions (a, {b, v, c} and
(b, {a, b, v, c}) of state (, U0, 0, , {a, b, v, c}) must be
chosen in Ω, as both events a and b are allowed by
the control pattern {a, b, v, c} and the augmented plant
Gζ . In U1, due to the fourth condition in Def. 5, both
nondeterministic outgoing transitions (c, {a, b, v, c}) to-
wards (c, U3, 3, c, {a, b, v, c}) and (c, U3, 5, c, {a, b, v, c})
must be allowed in Ω. Clearly, all reachable states
in Ω is co-reachable. Thus, after removing all un-
reachable states in Figure 11, the remaining struc-
ture Ω is a control feasible sub-automaton of P(H)
in Example 3. The corresponding supervisory control
map V : Po(L(G)) → Γ can be derived as follows:
V () := {a, b, v, c}, V (a) := {b, v, c}, V (b) := {a, b, v, c},
V (ac) := {a, b, v, c, } and V (bc) := {b, v, c}. Similarly,
we can check that in Example 2, each marked trajectory
in Figure 8 leads to one control feasible sub-automaton
Ω, which satisfies all conditions in Def. 5.
Theorem 4 Let P(H) be constructed as shown above.
Then there exists a nonblocking resilient supervisor can-
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didate of S∗ if and only if there exists a control feasible
reachable sub-automaton of P(H). 2
Proof: (1) To show the IF part, assume that Ω is a
control feasible reachable sub-automaton of P(H). Let
L := L(Ω). By the first condition in Def. 5, we know that
L is conditionally controllable with respect to ζ(L(G))
and {}×Γ. Thus, L ∈ C(ζ(L(G)), H). For all s ∈ L and
t ∈ g−1(g(s)) ∩ L, we know that g(s) = g(t) and there
must exist (σ, U, x1, σ, γ1, r1), (σ, U, x2, σ, γ2, r2) ∈ QΩ
with σ = g(s)↑ = g(t)↑ such that γ1 = γ2. Thus, the
first condition in Def. 4 holds. In addition, we have
EnL(s) :=
⋃
q=(g(s)↑,U,x,g(s)↑,γ,r)∈ΞΩ(q0,P ,s)
EnΩ(q).
Since
EnΩ(q) = (Po(γ)× Γ) ∩ EnGζ (x, g(s)↑, γ),
by the fourth condition of Def. 5, we know that⋃
(σ,U,x,σ,γ,r)∈ΞΩ(q0,P ,s)
EnGζ (x, σ, γ) = Enζ(L(G))(s),
where σ = g(s)↑. Thus, we haveEnL(s) = (Σo×p(s↑))∩
Enζ(L(G))(s). Finally, since Ω is co-reachable, and to-
gether with the fourth condition of Def. 5, we know that
L is nonblocking. Thus, by Def. 4, L is a nonblocking
resilient supervisor candidate of S∗.
(2) To show the ONLY IF part, assume that there ex-
ists a nonblocking resilient supervisor candidate L ⊆
S∗. We need to show that there exists a control fea-
sible sub-automaton Ω of P(H). We first construct a
sub-automaton P(H)L := (QL,Σo ×Γ,ΞL, q0,P , Qm,L),
where
QL := {q ∈ QP |(∃s ∈ L)q ∈ ΞP(q0,P , s)},
and Qm,L := QL ∩Qm,P . The transition map ΞL is the
restriction of ΞP over QL.
Let Ω be the sub-automaton P(H)L. Since L is a su-
pervisor candidate, by the first condition of Def. 4, we
have the following property:
(∀s ∈ L){[p(t)]↑|t ∈ g−1(g(s))∩L} = {p(s)↑}. (∗)
By the construction of P(H), we know that for each
state reachable by s, say (g(s)↑, Us, qs), and each state
reachable by t ∈ g−1(g(s)) ∩ L, say (g(t)↑, Ut, qt), we
have Us = Ut. Thus, if qs = (xs, g(s)
↑, γs, rs) and qt =
(xt, g(t)
↑, γt, rt), by the property (∗), we have γs = γt,
which means the second condition of Def. 5 holds. Based
on the construction of Ω, it is also clear that the condi-
tion (1) of Def. 5 holds because P(L)L is conditionally
controllable due to the conditional controllability of L.
Because P(H)L is derived from a language L, the fourth
condition of Def. 5 holds for P(H)L. In addition, since L
is a resilient supervisor candidate, by the second condi-
tion of Def. 4, we know that the third condition of Def.
5 holds. Finally, since L is nonblocking, based on Def. 3,
we know that each state in Ω must be co-reachable. This
completes the proof that Ω is indeed control feasible. 
Theorem 5 Given a plant G and a damaging language
Ldam ⊆ L(G), it is decidable whether there exists a non-
blocking supervisor V such that the closed-loop system
V/G is not attackable with respect to Ldam. 2
Proof: By Theorem 3, there exists a nonblocking super-
visor which disallows any regular smart sensor attack
with respect to Ldam if and only if there exists a non-
blocking resilient supervisor candidate L ⊆ S∗. By The-
orem 4, we know that there exists a nonblocking resilient
supervisor candidate if and only if there exists a con-
trol feasible sub-automaton of P(H), which recognizes
S∗. Since there exists a finite number of sub-automata in
P(H), the existence of a control feasible sub-automaton
of P(H) is decidable. Thus, the existence of a nonblock-
ing supervisor which disallows any regular smart sensor
attack with respect to Ldam is decidable. 
It is interesting to point out that, in general, there
are typically many choices of a control feasible sub-
automaton Ω, leading to possibly many resilient super-
visors. It is unfortunate that the most permissive re-
silient supervisor in terms of set inclusion of closed-
loop behaviours typically does not exist. For example,
in Example 2 there are up to three different supervisory
control maps depicted in Figure 8, leading to two non-
compatible maximally permissive supervisors: one gen-
erates the closed-loop behaviour of L(V1/G) = {avc}
and the other one generates L(V2/G) = {bvd}. It is an
interesting question whether the structure P(H) could
be used to directly synthesize a maximally permissive
nonblocking resilient supervisor, as it conceptually con-
tains all resilient supervisors.
6 Conclusions
Although in our early work [9] [10], the concept of
smart sensor attacks was introduced, and syntheses of a
smart sensor attack and a supervisor resilient to smart
sensor attacks were presented, it has not been shown
whether the existence of a nonblocking supervisor re-
silient to smart sensor attacks is decidable, as the syn-
thesis algorithm presented in [10] does not guarantee to
find a resilient supervisor, even though it may exist. In
this paper we have first shown that the existence of a reg-
ular smart weak sensor attack is decidable, and in case
it exists, it can be synthesized. Our first contribution is
to identify risky pairs that describe how a legal sequence
of control patterns may be used by a sensor attack to
inflict weak damage, which is stated in Theorem 1 that
there exists a smart weak sensor attack if and only if
there exists at least one risky pair. Notice that this re-
sult is valid, regardless of whether the attack model is
regular, i.e., representable by a finite-state automaton.
With this key idea, to ensure the existence of a super-
visor resilient to smart sensor attacks, we only need to
make sure that there should be no risky pairs. Our sec-
ond contribution is to show that all risky pairs can be
identified and removed from the plant behaviours, via a
genuine encoding scheme, upon which a verifiable suffi-
cient and necessary condition is presented to ensure the
existence of a nonblocking supervisor resilient to smart
sensor attacks. This establishes the result that the ex-
istence of a supervisor resilient to smart sensor attacks
is decidable. Finally, as out third contribution, the deci-
sion process renders a synthesis algorithm for a resilient
supervisor, whenever it exists, which has never been ad-
dressed in any existing works.
The decidability result established in this paper may
shed light on future research on cyber attack related re-
silient synthesis, e.g., to decide existence of a resilient
supervisor for smart actuator attacks or smart attacks
with observations different from those of the supervisor,
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which are gaining more and more attention recently. In
addition, this decidability result allows researchers to fo-
cus more on computational efficiency related to smart
sensor attacks. The main results of Theorem 1 and The-
orem 3 have been derived from a language-based frame-
work, which reveal the sufficient and necessary condi-
tions for the existence of a smart weak attack and a non-
blocking supervisor resilient to smart sensor attacks, re-
spectively. Thus, their validity may hold for many mod-
elling frameworks other than just finite-state automata.
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